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A study recently published in this journal showed that agreement with conspiracy 
theories about the Covid-19 pandemic is associated with risky, non-compliant behaviours 
(Freeman et al., 2020a). It also indicated that this agreement is very common: 45% of British 
participants seemed to agree that Covid-19 is a bioweapon designed by China to destroy the 
West, while 20% seemed to agree that the pandemic is a conspiracy by Jews or 
Muslims. Accurate or not, these statistics paint a worrying picture. If accurate, millions of 
British people need to be disabused of wild conspiracy theories. If inaccurate, especially if 
they exaggerate the popularity of conspiracy theories, they could normalise Antisemitic, 
Islamaphobic, and conspiracist viewpoints (McManus, D’Ardenne & Wessel, 2020), and 
misdirect policy, interventions, and further research.   
McManus et al. (2020) pointed out that Freeman et al.’s (2020a) study indeed runs 
these risks, because of a response scale that gave participants four options to agree (from 
“Agree A little” to “Agree Completely”), and only one other option (“Do not agree”). This 
imbalance of options is likely to cause participants who tend to acquiesce to perceived 
demands of survey questions to report inflated levels of agreement (Hibbing, Cawvey, Deol, 
Bloeser & Mondak, 2019).  
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We agree with this critique. As researchers who have published many papers on 
conspiracy theories, including their conceptualisation and measurement (Douglas & Sutton, 
2018; Douglas et al., 2019; Lantian, Muller, Nurra & Douglas, 2016; Sutton & Douglas, 
2020), we do not recall seeing a scale like Freeman et al.’s (2020a). Scales typically provide 
an even balance of responses to reject or accept conspiracy theories. This allows participants 
to express any view on the assumed continuum between strong disagreement and strong 
agreement. Since responses are typically below or near the midpoint on such scales (e.g., 
Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Jolley & Douglas, 2014), omitting degrees of disagreement seems 
an important mistake. Participants who disagree with a conspiracy theory, but are willing to 
admit that it might have some merit, may feel that they have no option but to select one of the 
“agree” responses. This hypothetical dilemma lends new meaning to the saying “agreeing to 
disagree”.   
To test the hypothesis that Freeman et al.’s (2020a) scale exaggerates agreement with 
conspiracy theories, we ran a brief, pre-registered study. Materials, anonymised data, and 
results are available on the Open Science Framework website: https://osf.io/xpvrz. We chose 
three conspiracy theories from Freeman et al., targeting Jews, Muslims, and China, that 
featured prominently in a press release (University of Oxford, 2020) and attracted media 
attention. We presented each to 748 British participants recruited from Prolific, a widely-used 
survey platform (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisiti, 2017), who were British nationals 
resident in the UK aged 18 or over, and not currently students since this group is over-
represented on Prolific. Their age ranged from 18 to 80 (M = 38.75, SD = 12.70; 506 were 
female, 238 male, and 4 were gender queer; 681 were White, 18 Black, 29 Asian, and 20 
were mixed race.  
Participants were then randomly assigned to three groups. The first group (n = 251) 
were given Freeman et al.’s (2020a) response scale. The second (n = 251) responded on a 
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conventional five-point scale featuring two options to disagree, two to agree, and a “neither 
agree nor disagree” option (see Douglas et al., 2019 for a summary of different conspiracy 
belief measures). The third group (n = 246) responded on a nine-point scale constructed by 
mirroring each of the four agreement responses in Freeman et al.’s (2020a) study with a 
corresponding disagreement response, and included a “neither agree nor disagree” option.  
Following Freeman et al. (2020) and our pre-registration, we coded as agreement (1) 
the four response options expressing agreement on Freeman et al.’s scale and the nine-point 
extension, and either of the options expressing agreement on the conventional five-point 
scale. Responses were otherwise coded as not expressing agreement (0). Thus, across the 
three conspiracy theories, participants could score between 0 (agreed with none) and 3 
(agreed with all).  
All conspiracy theories, response options, and response proportions are presented in 
Table 1. It reveals strikingly lower rates of agreement than in Freeman et al. (2020a). Even on 
the same response scale, 2% or 3% of our participants agreed with the conspiracy theories 
about Jews and Muslims (compared to 20% in Freeman et al.), and 32% (compared to 45%) 
agreed with the China theory. These differences between studies were expected (see 
preregistration) and significant (ps < .001). Their magnitude is surprising and noteworthy, but 
also difficult to interpret since the studies differ in many ways. For example, our study was 
run in late June 2020 and Freeman et al.’s study was run in early May; ours used a relatively 
educated sample, among whom slightly lower agreement with conspiracy theories can be 
expected (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry & Harvey, 2016).  
More pertinent, we found levels of agreement half as low, or lower, when we used 
conventional agree-disagree scales. Agreement with the China conspiracy theory reduced to 
roughly 10%; agreement with the conspiracy theories about Jews and Muslims fell to around 
1-1.5%. Levels of agreement on the five-point and nine-point agree-disagree scales were not 
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significantly different from each other, p = .712, but were significantly lower than on 
Freeman et al.’s scale (both ps < .001).   
Our results suggest that Freeman et al.’s (2020a) estimates of the popularity of Covid-
19 conspiracy theories were overestimated. Freeman et al. (2020b) wrote that “the item 
content, not the scale, seems to us to merit the real focus”, but in our study the scale doubled 
the apparent popularity of the item content. As happens often (Lee, Sutton, & Hartley, 2016), 
the striking descriptive statistics of Freeman et al.’s (2020a) study were highlighted in a press 
release that stripped them of nuance and caveats, and led to some sensational and misleading 
media reporting that may have complicated the very problems that we all, as researchers, are 
trying to help solve.  
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Table 1 
Proportion of respondents selecting each response to the three conspiracy theories 
 
 Freeman et al. (2020) response scale 
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Note.  Responses coded as agreement are shaded. “Sum agreement” represents the sum of these responses. For 
comparison, Freeman et al. (2020a) report 19.2% sum agreement for the Jewish conspiracy theory, 19.9% with 
the Muslim conspiracy theory, and 45.4% with the China conspiracy theory. For the nine-point response scale, 
“No agreement” subsumes the first five responses (Disagree completely, Disagree a lot, Disagree moderately, 
Disagree a little, Neither agree nor disagree).  For the Jewish, Muslim, and China conspiracy theories, the 
“Neither agree nor disagree” option on the 9-point scale was selected by 1.6%, 2.4%, and 8.9% of participants, 
respectively.  The remaining responses were disagree responses.   
 
